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A B S T R A C T
The article applies Social Choice theory to analyse new and
so far undiscovered aspects of the Danish referendums on
the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and 1993. The article queries
whether the amended Maastricht Treaty adopted in 1993
was, in fact, the most preferred alternative for a majority of
Danish voters. A reconstruction of voter preferences regard-
ing the political alternatives in the European Union – the
Maastricht Treaty, the amended Maastricht Treaty and the
Status Quo – reveals that the amended Maastricht Treaty,
despite the fact that it was the Condorcet winner and won
the 1993 referendum, may not have been preferred by a
majority but was probably the most preferred alternative
only for a minority of the electorate.
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Introduction
In 1992 and 1993 Danish voters faced a fundamental choice concerning the
future of Danish integration in the European Community/Union (EC/EU).
Voting on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, a small majority of 50.7% of the voters
rejected the treaty, whereas a year later a majority of 56.7% of the voters
accepted an amended version of the Maastricht Treaty. A common perception
of the results of these referendums is that they somehow reflect the ‘will of
the people’, i.e. that the amended version of the Maastricht Treaty represents
the Danish electorate’s collectively most preferred outcome. Indeed, the very
raison d’être of referendums supposedly is that they somehow express some
form of popular will. This justification for referendums is associated with
what William Riker (1982) calls the ‘populist’ conception of democracy. On
this view, referendums are perceived to be a fairer and more democratic way
of making political decisions, since the collective choice is made directly by
the voters (i.e. ‘the people’) rather than by indirect means, e.g. through legis-
lation in parliament (see Siune and Svensson, 1993: 100). One important virtue
of referendums is, no doubt, that they allow voters to express their prefer-
ences directly regarding one or more policy issues. However, this does not
mean that the outcome of referendums necessarily reflects a common elec-
toral will or a unique social welfare function in any meaningful sense. In fact,
from a social choice theory perspective, such a conception of referendums is
misconceived mainly owing to a lack of awareness of the way referendums
are designed and the importance of the institutions and collective choice
mechanisms that amalgamate individual preferences into a social choice (see
Nurmi, 1997; Brams et al., 1997, 1998; Saari, 2001).
However, whereas social choice theory notoriously tends to emphasize
problems that appear to be nothing but theoretical constructs and that are
difficult to corroborate empirically, mainstream approaches to the study of
referendums within political science have witnessed a surge in empirical
analyses of EU referendums in recent years (Siune and Svensson, 1993; Siune
et al., 1994; Franklin et al., 1994, 1995; Hug and Sciarini, 2000; Christin and
Hug, 2002: Svensson, 2002; Franklin, 2002; Hobolt, 2006, 2007). Many
resources have been devoted to examining factors influencing voter decisions
in referendums on European integration, for instance the role of information,
campaigning, party alignment, and party endorsement of the issue in
question (e.g. Siune and Svensson, 1993; Hobolt, 2006, 2007). In this regard,
a particularly contested issue is whether voters in EU referendums primarily
vote according to policy preferences or according to their (lack of) support
for the incumbent government (see Svensson, 2002; Franklin, 2002; Garry 
et al., 2005). Indeed, the relative importance of policy issues versus concerns
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for rewarding or punishing incumbent governments leaves voters in EU refer-
endums in an uncomfortable dilemma between favouring a proposal for its
political qualities and thereby rewarding an unsuccessful government or
rejecting the proposal, with the implication that a popular government is
punished (Schneider and Weitsman, 1996). Moreover, Hug and Sciarini (2000)
have shown that domestic institutions relating to whether referendums are
binding or non-binding and required or non-required affect voter decisions
on whether or not to support a proposal. Similarly, Christin and Hug (2002)
provide a theory and some evidence suggesting that institutionally induced
opportunities to subject EU-related policy proposals to a referendum may
increase voter support for European integration.
The present article departs from this literature by, firstly, adopting an
explicit social choice theory perspective on referendums. Although game
theory models have previously been used to analyse referendums on EU inte-
gration (Schneider and Weitsman, 1996; Christin and Hug, 2002), little atten-
tion has been given to the topic from the angle of social choice theory. As such,
the purpose of the paper is to analyse problems that potentially arise in relation
to the use of referendums as a method of preference aggregation. Secondly,
the paper does not primarily deal with the more traditional political science
issues, such as why voters vote ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ in EU referendums, or whether
EU referendums possess a ‘second-order election’ or ‘issue-voting’ character.
Rather, the article contributes to the empirical literature on EU referendums
by analysing possible discrepancies between the policy preferences of voters
and social choice that emerge in situations of sequential referendums and/or
three or more distinguishable alternatives. This will be illustrated by highlight-
ing novel features of the Danish referendums on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992
and 1993 that have so far been completely overlooked.
The following section considers possible relations between voter prefer-
ences and the social choices that emerged from the referendums in 1992 and
1993. I attempt to disentangle the preference orders of those voters who voted
Yes or No in both the 1992 and the 1993 referendums. The third section asks
whether there is a Condorcet winner among the set of EU political alterna-
tives, and the concluding section gives the key findings.
Voter preferences, collective rationality and social choice
Almost immediately after the voters’ rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992,
negotiations between the Danish government and key parliamentary oppo-
sition parties began on the future of Danish EU membership (see Siune et al.,
1994). The negotiations resulted in agreement on the so-called ‘national
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compromise’, which was supported by the government, the Social Liberal
Party, the Social Democratic Party and, significantly, the initially anti-
Maastricht Socialist People’s Party.
Substantially, the national compromise entailed that Denmark should opt
out of EU cooperation on four key dimensions that were all part of the original
Maastricht Treaty. These were (1) justice and home affairs, (2) a common
currency, (3) common citizenship, and (4) a common defence policy. Sub-
sequently, the governments of the other EU member countries agreed to grant
Denmark special status on the basis of the national compromise, allowing
Denmark to adopt an amended version of the Maastricht Treaty (the so-called
‘Edinburgh Agreement’), which included opt-out clauses on the four policy
issues.
In 1993 a new referendum was held on the amended Maastricht Treaty.
The result of the referendum was that the amended Maastricht Treaty received
a majority of 56.7% of the votes, thereby beating the Status Quo.1 Table 1
shows the change in Yes and No votes in the two referendums based on
survey data collected by Siune et al. (1993) and Andersen et al. (1993) after
the 1993 referendum.
It is clear from Table 1 that most voters chose to stick to their original
vote: an overwhelming majority (96–97%) of those voting Yes in 1992 also
voted Yes in 1993. Not surprisingly, more voters (18–23%) changed their vote
from No to Yes than the reverse (3–4%). Thus, introducing the amended
Maastricht Treaty as a third alternative implied that the No vote from the 1992
referendum was split to a degree that resulted in a relatively clear majority
in favour of the amended Maastricht Treaty.
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Table 1 Voting changes in the Maastricht and Edinburgh referendums
Edinburgh (amended Maastricht)
————————————————————————
Maastricht Yes (%) No (%)
——————————— ————————————
Siune Andersen Siune Andersen
Yes 97 96 3 4
No 23 18 77 82
Sources: Siune et al. (1993) and Andersen et al. (1993). 
Note: The real net change in votes between the Maastricht and Edinburgh referendums was 
56.7 – 49.3 = 7.4 percentage points.
Possible voter preferences
On the basis of the distribution of votes in Table 1, the question is whether it
is possible to make inferences with regard to voter preferences over the set
of EU political alternatives, X = {Maastricht (M), Edinburgh (E) and Status
Quo (SQ)}.2 It is fairly obvious that the voter population consisted of (at least)
four groups, N = {1yy, 2yn, 3ny, 4nn}, where the subscript indicates each
group’s voting behaviour at the referendum in 1992 and 1993, respectively.
That is, the voter groups voted as follows: Group 1yy: ‘Yes–Yes’; Group 2yn:
‘Yes–No’; Group 3ny: ‘No–Yes’; Group 4nn: ‘No–No’.
Given the distribution of votes in Table 1, it is further possible to estimate
the size of the four voter groups, as shown in Figure 1.3 As Figure 1 shows,
the largest voter groups (1yy and 4nn) were either in favour of both the
Maastricht Treaty and the Edinburgh Agreement or against them. However,
for the purpose of this study, the interesting thing to notice is that none of
the voter groups had an absolute majority. The largest group (over 47%)
consisted of those who voted Yes in both 1992 and 1993, whereas the smallest
group (up to 2%) voted Yes to the Maastricht Treaty but No to the Edinburgh
amendments.
The interesting question, then, is whether it is possible on the basis of the
information provided in Table 1 and Figure 1 to reconstruct the voter groups’
ordinal preference orderings with regard to the three relevant alternatives.4
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                 Yes  47.8%  [47.3%] (1yy)
                                       
  E  
  Yes 
49.3%                               No   1.5%     [2.0%] (2yn)
M
   No                                Yes 11.7%    [9.1%] (3ny)
  50.7%  
                          E 
                                         
                   No  39.0%   [41.6%] (4nn)
Figure 1 Voter behaviour in the Maastricht and Edinburgh referendums.
Notes: Percentages not in brackets are based on Siune et al. (1993); percentages in brackets are
based on Andersen et al. (1993). 
The numerically largest voter group (group 1yy) voted Yes in both the 1992
Maastricht referendum and the subsequent 1993 referendum, and was as such
the most pro-EU of the four groups. The implication of the voting behaviour
of group 1yy could lead one to reason that its most preferred alternative might
be the original 1992 Maastricht Treaty. The fact that group 1yy voted Yes in
1993 as well further indicates that the Edinburgh Agreement was a more
preferred alternative than the Status Quo. Consequently, it is straightforward
to infer that the Status Quo was the least preferred alternative. On this reason-
ing, an ordinal preference ordering would place the Edinburgh Agreement
between the Maastricht Treaty and the Status Quo. Thus, one might tenta-
tively infer that the collective preference order of group 1yy can be written as:
M  E  SQ. The problem is, of course, that it is difficult to establish
whether all Yes–Yes voters preferred the Maastricht Treaty to the Edinburgh
Agreement; i.e. whether M  E or E  M. We will return to this problem
below.
Group 2yn voted Yes to the 1992 Maastricht Treaty but No in the
Edinburgh referendum. Inferring from the voting behaviour of group 2yn, the
Maastricht Treaty was its most preferred alternative and the group’s rejection
of the 1993 Edinburgh Agreement indicates that the Status Quo was more
preferred than the Edinburgh Agreement, making the latter group 2yn’s least
preferred alternative. That is, since M  SQ and SQ  E, then by transi-
tivity M  E. This places the Status Quo in between the 1992 Maastricht
Treaty and the 1993 Edinburgh Agreement. Consequently, the collective
preference order of group 2 must be as follows: M  SQ  E.
Thirdly, group 3ny voted No in 1992 but Yes in the Edinburgh refer-
endum in 1993. The fact that group 3 voted Yes to the Edinburgh Agreement
strongly indicates that this alternative was more preferred than both the
Status Quo and the original Maastricht Treaty, thus making the Edinburgh
Agreement the most preferred alternative for group 3ny. The same logic entails
that the Status Quo for group 3ny was more preferred than the Maastricht
Treaty, which must then be considered the least preferred of the three alterna-
tives. In short, since E  SQ and SQ  M, then by transitivity E  M.
Placing the Status Quo alternative between the Maastricht Treaty and the
Edinburgh Agreement results in the following ordinal preference ordering for
group 3ny: E  SQ  M.
Finally, the No votes of group 4nn in both referendums indicate that it
strongly disapproved of both the original Maastricht Treaty and the
Edinburgh amendments. On the basis of the voting behaviour of group 4nn,
it is therefore relatively uncontroversial to infer that the Status Quo was the
group’s most preferred alternative. Furthermore, one might presume that the
1992 Maastricht Treaty was the least preferred alternative, the reason being
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that the Edinburgh Agreement did after all reduce the level of Danish inte-
gration into the EU, and so was probably perceived as being a lesser evil than
the Maastricht Treaty. This would place the Edinburgh Agreement between
the Status Quo and the Maastricht Treaty in an ordinal preference ordering.
The resulting collective preference order of group 4nn would then be: 
SQ  E  M. However, as with the Yes–Yes voters, the difficulty with this
reasoning is that it is not straightforward to establish whether M  E or 
E  M for all No–No voters.5
Given the analysis above, the provisional ordinal preference orderings of
the four voter groups regarding the three EU political alternatives are
summarized in Table 2. The most striking observation from Table 2 is that the
1993 Edinburgh Agreement may have been the most preferred alternative for
a very small proportion of voters, possibly as few as 9.1%. Despite the fact
that the Edinburgh Agreement was the winning alternative and became the
social choice following the two referendums, this indicates that the Edinburgh
Agreement may have ranked highest in the preference order of only a small
minority of Danish voters.
The difficulty with the analysis above, however, is that, although the
preference orders for groups 2 and 3 seem reasonable given their voting
behaviour, it is – as mentioned – less reasonable to infer the preference orders 
M  E  SQ for group 1yy and SQ  E  M for group 4nn as a whole,
because at least substantial parts of these groups may, in fact, have had
preference orders in which the E and M alternatives were reversed.
Reconsidering the preference order of the Yes–Yes and
No–No voters
To resolve the problem of the ranking of the M and E alternatives for the
Yes–Yes and No–No voters, I have empirically tried to estimate the relative
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Table 2 Possible voter preferences regarding EU political alternatives
Group 1yy Group 2yn Group 3ny Group 4nn
47.8/47.3% 1.5/2.0% 11.7/9.1% 39.0/41.6%
M M E SQ
E SQ SQ E
SQ E M M
Note: The first percentage figure is based on Siune et al. (1993); the second figure is based on
Andersen et al. (1993).
size of the subgroups of voters in groups 1yy and 4nn who (possibly) preferred
E  M rather than M  E. To this end, I use data from the same surveys on
which Tables 1 and 2 are based. The surveys in Siune et al. (1993) and
Andersen et al. (1993) provide data on a number of questions pertaining to
the attitudes of the respondents to the Maastricht Treaty and the Edinburgh
Agreement, and specifically the issues relating to the Edinburgh amendments.
Furthermore, these issues have been shown to be important for how the
Danish voters voted in 1992 and 1993 (Siune et al., 1993, 1994; Svensson, 2002).
However, the analyses below implicitly rest on the assumption that
‘policy matters’ in voter decisions on whether to vote Yes or No in the refer-
endums. In light of the debate on whether EU referendums are really on EU
political issues or are for or against the incumbent government (Siune and
Svensson, 1993; Siune et al., 1994; Franklin et al., 1994, 1995; Franklin, 2002;
Svensson, 2002; Garry et al., 2005), I have – in order to substantiate the
assumption – performed a number of logistical regressions so as to investi-
gate whether voter attitudes towards the (amended) Maastricht Treaty were
instrumental in determining the propensity of voters to vote either Yes or No.
The results are presented in the appendix.6 The regressions clearly demon-
strate that voter attitudes towards the (amended) Maastricht Treaty were
important for voters’ decisions on whether to vote Yes or No.7 Thus, the
underlying assumption of the analyses below seems quite reasonable.8
The question is, then, how we can estimate the size of the subgroups of
Yes–Yes and No–No voters who might have preferred E  M? Obviously,
this is an inherently difficult task. As a starting point, I note that for the
Yes–Yes voters it is, as shown above, reasonable to preclude any preference
order in which SQ is ranked above M or E. Similarly for the No–No voters,
we can exclude any preference order in which M or E is ranked above SQ.
Secondly, on the basis of the surveys by Siune et al. (1993) and Andersen et
al. (1993) I have constructed a series of indicator variables of voter attitudes
to the (amended) Maastricht Treaty, which can help establish the preference
orders of the Yes–Yes and No–No voters. Because the surveys contain
different questions relating to the same policy issues, I have constructed six
different indicators based on different questions. However, all the questions
do solely concern voter attitudes to the opt-out clauses of the Edinburgh
Agreement (see appendix for details).
I then constructed two types of indicators. In the first, I isolated the group
of voters who were in favour of EU political integration in all the policy areas
where Denmark was granted opt-out clauses in 1993 and on which the
surveys contain information. This group was then compared with the group
of voters who were against one or more of the same policy areas. Because 
the first group comprises voters who were in favour of more EU political
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integration than the Edinburgh Agreement offered, it seems reasonable to
assume that that they preferred the full Maastricht Treaty to the Edinburgh
Agreement (M  E). On the other hand, the voters in the second group were
against integration in at least one of the policy areas, and therefore in favour
of at least one of the opt-out clauses, and were consequently less positive
about full integration. The preference order of these voters is thus assumed
to be given by E  M.
However, this approach is likely to overestimate support for the
Edinburgh Agreement. For instance, if a voter was against only one of the four
policy areas and in favour of integration on the other three issues, then s/he
is assumed to prefer E  M, even though s/he was in favour of integration
on a majority of issues, and may therefore have preferred M  E. To rectify
this problem I constructed a second type of indicator variable, which is a repli-
cation of the first index, except that the voters who were in favour of all but
one issue are assumed to prefer M  E, whereas the remainder of the voters
are assumed to prefer E  M. This will probably provide a somewhat more
realistic account of the size of the voter groups who preferred M  E or 
E  M, respectively. Regardless of which aggregation method one prefers, we
get – if nothing else – a measure of the interval of support for the alternatives
among the voters.
On the basis of the six indicator variables, the Yes–Yes and No–No voters
from Table 2 were divided into two subgroups with the preference orders 
M  E and E  M, respectively. Table 3 shows the support for the
Maastricht Treaty and the Edinburgh Agreement within each subgroup of
Yes–Yes and No–No voters.
Table 3 reveals some variation in the estimates of the size of the positive
Yes–Yes voters (top row) and the less positive Yes–Yes voters (second row).
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Table 3 Voter support for Maastricht and Edinburgh, Yes–Yes and No–No voters (%)
Index
———————————————————————————————
A B C D E F
(4/4) (3/4) (4/4) (3/4) (3/3) (3/3)
Yes–Yes (M  E) 19.0 34.1 25.1 48.6 28.8 31.4
Yes–Yes (E  M) 81.0 65.9 74.9 51.4 71.2 68.6
No–No (M  E) 0 1.6 0.4 4.0 2.0 1.5
No–No (E  M) 100 98.4 99.6 96.0 98.0 98.5
Note: Numbers denote the percentages of each subgroup of Yes–Yes and No–No voters within
the total group of Yes–Yes and No–No voters, respectively. See appendix for details.
On the most optimistic estimate (index A), the Edinburgh Agreement seems
to have been more preferred than the Maastricht Treaty for around 80% of
the Yes–Yes voters. However, as mentioned this estimate is probably biased
upwards, i.e. in the direction of exaggerating support for the Edinburgh
Agreement. On the other hand, according to the least optimistic estimate
(index D), the Yes–Yes voters were (roughly) equally divided in their support
for Maastricht and Edinburgh. Therefore, it seems safe to conclude that at
least 50% and at most 80% of the Yes–Yes voters preferred E  M, whereas
somewhere between 20% and 50% preferred M  E.
As might be expected, an overwhelming majority of No–No voters were
consistently against further EU political integration in the policy areas
contained in the opt-out clauses of the Edinburgh Agreement. In fact, only a
very small minority – at most 4% – of the No–No voters were positive towards
increasing EU integration despite voting No. We can therefore divide the
No–No group into two subgroups, in which a small minority had a prefer-
ence order where SQ  M  E, whereas the preference order of the large
majority is given by SQ  E  M.
Overall, these results suggest that it is indeed reasonable to divide the
Yes–Yes and No–No voters into subgroups with different priorities as to the
choice between the Maastricht Treaty and the Edinburgh Agreement.
However, doing so is particularly important for the Yes–Yes voters. This
supports the view that not all Yes–Yes voters preferred M  E, and that a
substantial proportion of the voters who voted Yes to the Maastricht Treaty
in 1992 did so despite being only moderately positive in their attitudes
towards the Maastricht Treaty, and despite having some (at the time un-
specified) intermediate alternative as their most preferred alternative. Since
the size of the remaining two voter groups is unaffected by the re-estimation
of the size of the new groups of Yes–Yes and No–No voters, Table 4 sum-
marizes information on the ordinal preference orderings and size of the now
six voter groups.
Table 4 provides a somewhat more realistic account of the relative size
of the voter groups. This obviously means that the Edinburgh Agreement was
the most preferred alternative for a proportion of the voters (groups 2yy and
4ny) that was significantly greater than the 11.7% (or 9.1%) estimate in 
Table 2. That is, apart from the voters in group 4ny, somewhere between 24.6%
and 38.7% of the voters (group 2yy) preferred the Edinburgh Agreement to
the Maastricht Treaty.
Given this information, we can derive an estimate of the proportion of
voters supporting each of the three EU political alternatives (M, E and SQ).
This is done in Table 5. The estimates show that the two alternatives with the
greatest support in the electorate were the Edinburgh Agreement and the
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Status Quo. Generally, the Maastricht Treaty was not particularly popular: at
best it was the most preferred alternative for around 25% of voters, and at
worst for as few as 10%. According to the most optimistic estimates (column
1), the Edinburgh Agreement may, in fact, have been the most preferred
alternative for a bare majority of 50.4% of Danish voters. However, it would
probably be premature to conclude that the Edinburgh Agreement was
preferred by a majority based on this result. Firstly, the estimate of 50.4% is
almost certainly exaggerated (see above). Secondly, whereas the other esti-
mates suggest that support for Edinburgh was substantial, more realistic
estimates (e.g. index B in column 2) show that support for the Edinburgh
amendments was probably well below 50%, somewhere in the neighbour-
hood of 40%, and perhaps even as low as 36% (index D). In fact, of the six
estimates in Table 5, five indicate that the Edinburgh Agreement was not
preferred by a majority, but rather was preferred by a plurality of Danish
voters. Thus, whereas the Edinburgh Agreement was certainly the most
preferred alternative for a large proportion of voters, it is probably reason-
able to conclude that a majority of Danish voters preferred a different alterna-
tive. That is, the polarization of voters as to the most preferred level of EU
political integration meant that a majority probably preferred either more or
less integration than was offered by the Edinburgh Agreement.
Why, then, did the Edinburgh Agreement become the social choice? The
obvious answer is that it did so, not necessarily by being the most highly
valued alternative for the majority of voters, but because it was the alterna-
tive that – given the choice between the Edinburgh Agreement and the Status
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Table 4 Ordinal preference structure regarding EU political alternatives given six
voter groups
Voter groups and preference order 
————————————————————————————————————
Group 1yy Group 2yy Group 3yn Group 4ny Group 5nn Group 6nn
Index M E SQ E M SQ M SQ E E SQ M SQ M E SQ E M
A (4/4) 9.1 38.7 1.5 11.7 0.0 39.0
B (3/4) 16.3 31.5 1.5 11.7 0.6 38.4
C (4/4) 12.0 35.8 1.5 11.7 0.2 38.8
D (3/4) 23.2 24.6 1.5 11.7 1.6 37.4
E (3/3) 13.6 33.7 2.0 9.1 0.8 40.8
F (3/3) 14.9 32.4 2.0 9.1 0.6 41.0
Notes: Numbers are percentages. Horizontal summation within rows equals 100.
Quo – was closest to the bliss-point of the median voter. Compared with the
1992 referendum, the combination of the votes of groups 1yy, 2yy and 4ny was
sufficient to form the majority necessary to beat the Status Quo.
The Condorcet winner
On the basis of the structure of voter preferences displayed in Table 4, it is
now possible to examine whether the set of alternatives X = (M, E, SQ)
contains a Condorcet winner; i.e. an alternative that can beat all other alterna-
tives in a pairwise comparison regardless of the voting sequence and using
simple majority voting (Riker, 1982: 100; Gehrlein, 1983: 162; McLean, 1988:
66; Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2001). In so far as the Edinburgh Agreement was
preferred by a majority, it was obviously the Condorcet winner too. However,
since it is more likely that the Edinburgh Agreement was preferred by a
plurality rather than by a majority, and because plurality winners are not
always Condorcet winners (Riker and Wright, 1989), it is reasonable to query
the status of the Edinburgh Agreement as a Condorcet winner.
From the two referendums we know that the Edinburgh Agreement beat
the Status Quo with 56.7% of the votes.9 Secondly, we know that Status Quo
beat the Maastricht Treaty by a majority of 50.7% in the 1992 referendum.
From Table 4 we can furthermore infer that the Edinburgh Agreement was
majority-preferred to the Maastricht Treaty by between 73.7% and 89.4% of
the voters (groups 2yy, 4ny and 6nn). Using the Condorcet method we accord-
ingly obtain the following collective preference order: E  SQ  M.
This result is interesting for (at least) three reasons. First of all, it reveals
that the Edinburgh Agreement – the winner of the 1993 referendum – was
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Table 5 Total support for the three EU political alternatives as the most preferred
alternative
A (4/4) B (3/4) C (4/4) D (3/4) E (3/3) F (3/3)
Total support for E.
(groups 2yy + 4ny) 50.4 42.9 47.5 36.3 42.8 41.5
Total support for M.
(groups 1yy + 3yn) 10.6 18.1 13.5 24.7 15.6 16.9
Total support for SQ.
(groups 5nn + 6nn) 39.0 39.0 39.0 39.0 41.6 41.6
Notes: Numbers are percentages. Vertical summation within columns equals 100.
the Condorcet winner and thus the collectively most preferred alternative,
despite the fact that it was probably not the most preferred alternative for a
majority of voters. Secondly, the fact that a Condorcet winner exists rules out
the possibility of a Condorcet paradox (i.e. a collectively intransitive prefer-
ence order where A  B  C  A . . .). Thus, in so far as the Condorcet
method is considered a kind of democratic fairness criterion (McLean, 1988:
66), the 1993 referendum did, in fact, produce the ‘right’ social choice. Thirdly,
since the collectively most preferred alternative was probably the most
preferred alternative only for a plurality of voters, it would be possible – and
quite legitimate – for a majority of between 52.5% and 63.7% of the voters to
be dissatisfied with the final result of the two referendums in 1992 and 1993.
Stated differently, for a majority of the voters, the winning alternative may
not have been the most preferred alternative, but instead a lower-ranking and
less preferred alternative.
Although the Edinburgh Agreement was probably the Condorcet winner
and the collectively most preferred alternative, given the alternatives for
consideration, this makes an unambiguous interpretation of the results of the
1992 and 1993 referendums much more difficult. We cannot say that the
Edinburgh Agreement was preferred by a majority of the Danish electorate
simply because 56.7% of the voters voted Yes in 1993. To understand the EU
political preferences of the Danish voters, we need to disentangle voter
preferences instead, and take into account that a substantial proportion of
voters – most likely a majority – preferred a level of integration different from
the one offered by the Edinburgh Agreement. This fundamentally alters the
way we perceive the result of the Danish EU referendums in 1992 and 1993
and the four amendments that were added to the Maastricht Treaty in 1993
and that are still in effect today.
Conclusion
The purpose of this article has not been to assess whether the outcome of the
Danish referendums in 1992 and 1993 was right or wrong. The purpose has
solely been to analyse the relationship between voter preferences and the
outcome that emerged as the social choice following the referendums in 1992
and 1993. The most significant finding in this article is that it is doubtful
whether the Edinburgh Agreement – despite the fact that it won the 1993
referendum and despite its probable status as a Condorcet winner – consti-
tutes an expression of some general EU political will of the Danish people in
any meaningful sense. Nevertheless, on the positive side, there are strong
arguments that the Edinburgh Agreement was the ‘right’ outcome of the 1992
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and 1993 referendums. Regardless of how voter preferences are reconstructed,
the Edinburgh Agreement comes out as the Condorcet winner and the median
voter favourite. In addition, it may also have been the most preferred alterna-
tive for the largest proportion of voters. On the other hand, taking into
account that a substantial proportion of Danish voters preferred the
Maastricht Treaty or the Status Quo to the Edinburgh Agreement, the latter
was most likely not preferred by a majority of voters. This renders the
interpretation of the outcome of the referendums in 1992 and 1993 more
ambiguous than has been recognized until now, and questions the presence
of a unique social choice that reflects the Danish voters’ most preferred level
of integration into the EU. As such, it is quite simply questionable whether
referendums can be conceived as a procedure by which information on indi-
vidual preferences and values in a simple and uncomplicated manner can be
translated into an unambiguous social choice that somehow reflects the will
of the people on the issue in question.
Notes
I am grateful to Hannu Nurmi, Steven Brams, Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, Robert
Klemmensen, Gerald Schneider and the anonymous referees at EUP for construc-
tive comments, and to Jens Wagner at the Danish Data Archive for kindly provid-
ing data and documentation on the Maastricht and Edinburgh referendums in
Denmark. An earlier version of the paper was presented at the 2006 meeting of
the European Public Choice Society in Turku, Finland, where it won the Wicksell
Prize.
1 The Danish referendums in 1992 and 1993 have some similarity to the Irish
referendums on the Nice Treaty in 2001 and 2002, where the Irish voters first
rejected the Treaty but then voted in favour of it a year later (see Garry et al.,
2005). However, in the Irish case, the 2001 and 2002 referendums were on the
same Treaty. That is, unlike in the Danish case of the Maastricht Treaty, no
opt-out clauses were added to the Nice Treaty following the 2001 rejection in
Ireland. The only difference between the 2001 and 2002 referendums on the
Nice Treaty was that the Irish government and the European Council issued
two declarations at the Seville summit in 2002 stating that the Nice Treaty
would not affect the policy of Irish military neutrality. However, these
declarations did not substantially alter the Nice Treaty (see Garry et al., 2005:
207–8; Department of Taoiseach, 2002).
2 Note that the exact content of the alternative identified as Status Quo is
somewhat unclear. In addition, it is possible that voter perceptions of the
Status Quo – i.e. perceptions of what would happen if the outcome of 1993
referendum was another No – changed between 1992 and 1993 (see Svensson,
2002: 743). In any case, the Status Quo alternative might be interpreted as
containing ‘anything but’ the Maastricht Treaty (or the Edinburgh Agreement),
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involving, presumably, less integration into the EU. This includes a range of
policy positions, from complete withdrawal from the EU to upholding the pre-
1992 membership status.
3 The numbers in Figure 1 are calculated as the proportion of voters whose
voting behaviour remained the same or changed between 1992 and 1993. For
example, 97% of the 49.3% who voted Yes in 1992 also voted Yes in 1993;
hence the net size of the ‘Yes–Yes’ voters is 47.8%.
4 Voter preferences are assumed to be both (strongly) transitive and complete.
Preferences are transitive if X  Y and Y  Z → X  Z. Preferences are
complete if, given a choice between X and Y, a person prefers either X  Y,
Y  X or X ~ Y, the latter expression indicating indifference.
5 A potential problem with constructing these voter groups is that it was not
the exact same electorate that voted at the two referendums; i.e. changes
occurred owing to natural causes and possible abstentions in one of the
referendums. However, since the referendums were close – separated by
approximately one year – the problem with changes in the electorate is not
very severe. Turnout was 83.1% in 1992 and 86.5% in 1993.
6 The appendix is available at http://www.uni-konstanz.de/eup/issues.htm.
7 Ideally, the empirical analyses would focus on the dynamics of voters
changing their votes from 1992 to 1993. However, this would require the use
of a panel data set, which unfortunately – to the best of the my knowledge
– does not exist for the 1992 and 1993 referendums.
8 Another objection to the analyses is that they presume that the policy space
is unidimensional, whereas in reality it might be multidimensional. To in-
vestigate this, I have conducted a series of principal component factor
analyses (PCA) in order to derive the number of underlying dimensions of
EU policy space in the Danish electorate. The PCAs were based on the items
listed in appendix A, Table A1. In all cases the PCAs extract only one factor.
This validates the assumption that the policy space may be considered uni-
dimensional. Detailed results are available upon request.
9 Using the data from indexes A–D in the first four rows of Table 4, Edinburgh
beat SQ by 59.5%. The small difference is owing to sampling error in the
survey data.
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